No. 2/2026 | May 2026

Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape and Implications for Thailand

Orathai Phubunlap Gunaseelan* 

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           This paper examines Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy by drawing on key insights presented by Kazakhstani scholars during academic exchanges with Thai counterparts under the academic project of the Royal Thai Embassy in Astana entitled “Strengthening Academic and Educational Cooperation between Thailand and Central Asia, Contributing to the Establishment of a Central Asia Studies Center in Thailand,” held in Thailand from 7 to 13 February 2026. These exchanges provided valuable perspectives on the conceptual foundations, evolution, and practical implementation of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, particularly in the context of shifting geopolitical dynamics following the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Building on these insights, the paper analyzes the core principles and strategic dimensions of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector approach through the lenses of realism and hedging theory, highlighting how the country has navigated major power competition while preserving its strategic autonomy. It further explores the implications of this approach for Thailand, with particular emphasis on maintaining strategic balance, enhancing diplomatic flexibility, strengthening economic diversification, and pursuing proactive diplomacy in an increasingly multipolar international environment.

1. Core Principles Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy

           Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy can be analyzed from a realist perspective, in which major powers compete to expand their influence, while small and middle powers seek to balance among them in order to preserve autonomy and ensure survival within an anarchic international system[1]. Kazakhstan’s foreign affairs can also be interpreted through the lens of hedging strategy, suggesting that small and middle powers do not fully balance against nor bandwagon with major powers; rather, they adopt a mixed strategy of cooperation and diversification to manage uncertainty and mitigate risks[2]. These two international relations concepts enhance our understanding of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy behaviour, particularly given its strategic location in the heart of Eurasia between two major powers, namely, Russia and China.

           One of the core principles of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, as reflected in the aforementioned theoretical concepts, is the safeguarding of its sovereignty and maintenance of internal stability following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. As a newly independent state, Kazakhstan shares a border of nearly 7,800 kilometers with Russia, the longest continuous international border in the world, and a border of approximately 1,800 kilometers with China. In response to geopolitical setting, Kazakhstan has adopted a multi-vector diplomatic approach to preserve its independence and ensure strategic autonomy. Although the term “multi-vector foreign policy” was not explicitly used in the early 1990s, its fundamental principles can be traced to the policy article of the first President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, “Strategy for the Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State” published in 1992[3]. A key element in this policy was the prioritization of Kazakhstan’s security, pursued through various means, including the establishment of strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries and the strengthening of close cooperation with other Central Asian states, as well as other countries beyond. 

           During the 1990s, Kazakhstan strategically implemented its multi-vector diplomacy by engaging multiple powers simultaneously and leveraging its abundant natural resources, especially oil and gas, to attract diverse foreign investment and partnerships. The presence of numerous international energy companies, especially those from major powers such as Chevron and ExxonMobil from the United States, Shell and Eni from Europe, Lukoil and Rosneft from Russia, and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) from China, and the development of export infrastructure, particularly the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), demonstrate how Kazakhstan has successfully diversified its economic linkages while avoiding overdependence on any single partner[4]. This strategy was most visible during the leadership of President Nazarbayev, who articulated a pragmatic and balanced approach to foreign policy, emphasizing non-ideological alignment with any single power and a strong focus on national interests. From here, without explicitly mentioning the term “multi-vector” in its foreign policy at that time, its underlying principles, namely, balance, flexibility, and diversification were clearly embedded in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy approach.

           The core principles of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy have been particularly evident under its second President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who previously served as Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister during the leadership of President Nazarbayev and played a key role in shaping the country’s diplomatic orientation. These principles are clearly articulated in Kazakhstan’s officially foreign policy-related documents such as the Foreign Policy Concept for the Republic of Kazakhstan from 2020 - 2030[5]. Under President Tokayev’s leadership, Kazakhstan has continuously pursued its foreign policy of non-alignment, refraining from choosing sides among major powers while maintaining constructive relations with all. This strategy is reflected in Kazakhstan’s sustained engagement across multiple geopolitical and institutional frameworks. In its relations with Russia, Kazakhstan is a member of Russian-led organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In parallel, Kazakhstan maintains close economic cooperation with China and plays a crucial role in the Belt and Road Initiative, particularly through key connectivity projects such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, thereby reinforcing its role as a key transit hub linking Asia and Europe.

           Kazakhstan actively pursues partnerships with other major powers, including the United States and European countries. This is reflected in Kazakhstan’s participation in United States-supported frameworks such as the C5+1 format, which aims to strengthen cooperation and strategic dialogue between the United States and the five Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan. Established in 2015, the C5+1 platform has evolved into a key mechanism for addressing shared regional priorities, including security, economic development, environmental sustainability, and regional connectivity. In advancing its cooperation with the European Union, particularly through the European Union’s Global Gateway strategy, Kazakhstan aims to enhance economic, connectivity and sustainable infrastructure development. The European Union remains Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partner, accounting for a significant share of its total trade and foreign direct investment (FDI)[6]. Several European countries are among Kazakhstan’s key investors and trading partners, notably the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Cyprus, and Luxembourg, while major European companies such as Shell, Eni, Alstom, and Air Liquide operate extensively in sectors including energy, transport, and industry[7]. Such a multidirectional engagement demonstrates Kazakhstan’s strategic effort to balance relations among Russia, China, and the West, while avoiding overdependence on any single actor.

2. Key Dimensions of Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy

           While Kazakhstan’s foreign policy under President Nazarbayev was primarily oriented toward ensuring national security and state consolidation, the administration of President Tokayev has placed a stronger emphasis on economic diplomacy as a central pillar of its multi-vector foreign policy. Under President Nazarbayev, multi-vector diplomacy functioned as a strategic tool to balance relations among major powers while attracting foreign investment into the energy sector, particularly oil and gas, which formed the backbone of the national economy. In contrast, President Tokayev’s foreign policy reflects a shift toward leveraging Kazakhstan’s external relations to support domestic economic transformation and long-term development. Central to this approach is the concept of “economic diplomacy,” outlined in the Foreign Policy Concept for the Republic of Kazakhstan from 2020 - 2030, prioritizing the expansion of trade, investment, and connectivity beyond the traditional resource-based sectors. Recognizing the risks associated with overdependence on hydrocarbons, President Tokayev’s administration has actively promoted economic diversification into areas such as manufacturing, digital economy, logistics, green energy, and financial services. Particular attention has been placed to President Tokayev’s ambitious vision to transform Kazakhstan into a fully digitalized state by the end of the decade, with 2026 designated as the “Year of Digitalization and Artificial Intelligence”[8].

           Another strategic dimension of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy is its active engagement in multilateralism and regionalism. Kazakhstan has consistently leveraged multilateral platforms to enhance its international standing and position itself as a constructive and neutral actor in international affairs. At the global level, Kazakhstan has played an active role within the framework of the United Nations, particularly in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Kazakhstan, along with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, was one of the key locations for the deployment of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Following its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons and has since sought to build its international identity as a responsible and peace-oriented state. This commitment is reflected in its decision to close the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in 1991, one of the largest nuclear testing grounds in the former Soviet Union, and to subsequently transfer all nuclear warheads from its territory[9]. Kazakhstan has also played an active role in advancing international non-proliferation norms and promoting the nuclear-weapon-free zone. This commitment is seen through Kazakhstan’s acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1994 and the Treaty of Semipalatinsk in 2006 to establish the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ), legally prohibiting the development, acquisition, or deployment of nuclear weapons in the region. Furthermore, Kazakhstan initiated the International Day against Nuclear Tests, officially recognized by the United Nations and observed annually on 29 August, as well as the ATOM Project, which aims to raise global awareness of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear testing. In addition, Kazakhstan has contributed to global nuclear security by hosting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank, which provides countries with access to nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes while reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation. Through these initiatives, Kazakhstan has reinforced its image as a proactive advocate for global disarmament and a responsible stakeholder in international security.

           In addition, Kazakhstan has demonstrated leadership in multilateral diplomacy by initiating and hosting numerous international dialogue platforms. A notable example is the Astana International Forum, which was initiated by President Tokayev and designed in a format similar to the World Economic Forum in Davos or the Boao Forum for Asia, bringing together global leaders, policymakers, and experts to address pressing international issues[10]. Kazakhstan has further reinforced its role as a convening power on issues of global concern. This is illustrated by the Regional Ecological Summit, held in Astana from 22 to 24 April 2026, which focused on environmental sustainability, climate cooperation, and regional responses to ecological challenges in Central Asia. Another important initiative is the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, which serves as a platform for interfaith dialogue and the promotion of mutual understanding among diverse religious communities. Collectively, these initiatives reflect Kazakhstan’s positions as a neutral platform for constructive dialogue among diverse actors. Through such engagements, Kazakhstan enhances its international visibility, expands its diplomatic networks, and reinforces its role as a bridge between regions, major powers, and civilizations. This approach is also widely interpreted as part of Kazakhstan’s broader aspiration to consolidate its status as a middle power in the international system[11].

           At the regional level, Kazakhstan has been a key proponent of regionalism in Central Asia. A distinct example of this advocacy is reflected in its active participation in the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia, which have emerged as an important platform for regional dialogue, trust-building, and coordination on shared challenges[12]. This approach is further institutionalized in Kazakhstan’s “Concept for the Development of Regional Cooperation until 2040,” which outlines a long-term vision for strengthening regional integration through enhanced economic cooperation, connectivity, sustainable resource management, and collective responses to shared security challenges[13]. Kazakhstan has also taken a leading role in broader regional initiatives. Notably, it initiated the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), comprising 28 member states, including Thailand, serving as a platform for enhancing dialogue, confidence-building, and cooperation across Asia. In addition, Kazakhstan actively participates in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), through which it engages in security, economic, and political cooperation with member states across the Eurasian region, as well as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), reflecting its efforts to strengthen ties within the Turkic world based on shared cultural and historical linkages. At the broader international level, Kazakhstan is a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and notably served as its Chair in 2010, the first post-Soviet and Central Asian country to do so, demonstrating its commitment to European security, dialogue, and multilateral diplomacy. Furthermore, Kazakhstan participates in the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), which promotes continent-wide cooperation across Asia, and has expressed interest in expanding engagement with emerging global groupings such as BRICS as a partner country, as part of its broader strategy to diversify partnerships in an increasingly multipolar world. Through participation in these diverse institutional frameworks, Kazakhstan enhances its diplomatic flexibility, expands its economic and political networks, and reinforces its role as a bridge between regions and major powers, while preserving room to advance its own national interest.

3. Russia-Ukraine Conflict as a Test for Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Diplomacy

           The Russia-Ukraine conflict that started in February 2022 represents a critical test for Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy in response to rapidly changing geopolitical circumstances. From the perspective of realism, the conflict presents the struggle of power among major powers and the way small and middle powers carefully calibrate between stronger powers to preserve their independence in an anarchic international system. Kazakhstan’s response in this system can be reflected through hedging strategy, i.e., not fully balanced nor bandwagon with any single power, but rather through a combination of selective alignment with strategic diversification in order to mitigate risks and maintain flexibility as well as an ability to assert its own national interests. On the one hand, Kazakhstan continuously reaffirmed its commitment to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity enshrined in the United Nations’ Charter and the adherence to international laws as the key pillar in its foreign policy by refusing to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories. This position is notable during President Tokayev’s participation in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2022 with the presence of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, where President Tokayev explicitly stated that Kazakhstan would not recognize any “quasi-state territories, including the self-proclaimed republics in Ukraine’s eastern region[14]. This remark reflected Kazakhstan’s strong commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity and its adherence to international norms, despite having sensitivity to the bilateral relationship with Russia. On the other hand, Kazakhstan has exercised considerable caution to avoid direct confrontation with Russia, given its geographic proximity, deep economic interdependence, and enduring security ties[15]. Recognizing these challenges, Kazakhstan has maintained stable and cooperative relations with Russia while continuing its participation in Russian-led regional frameworks such as CSTO and EAEU. This approach reflects a pragmatic effort to mitigate the risks of political and economic retaliation from Russia while preserving essential security and economic linkages. Such a strategy is further illustrated by President Tokayev’s decision to visit Russia as his first foreign destination following his re-election in November 2022, signaling continuity in bilateral relations while also reflecting the priority accorded to Russia in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy despite broader geopolitical tensions.

           The Russia-Ukraine conflict has demonstrated evident elements of Kazakhstan’s hedging strategy in its response to Western sanctions on Russia. While refraining from formally joining sanctions against Russia, Kazakhstan has taken concrete regimes to ensure its compliance with international restrictions and to prevent sanctions circumvention through its territory. This approach is seen in Kazakhstan’s introduction of stricter export controls, enhanced customs monitoring, and digital tracking systems to regulate the re-export of dual-use and sanctioned goods[16]. These measures are aimed not only at avoiding secondary sanctions but also at maintaining trust and credibility with Kazakhstan’s Western partners, particularly the United States and the European Union. This dual-track approach highlights Kazakhstan’s ability to balance its economic pragmatism with reputational considerations amid geopolitical challenges. At the same time, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has provided an opportunity for Kazakhstan’s long-term strategy of economic diversification and connectivity development, constituting a crucial dimension of President Tokayev’s multi-vector foreign policy. The conflict has disrupted traditional trade routes through Russia via its Northern Corridor and has helped intensify Kazakhstan’s efforts to develop alternative trade routes, most notably the Middle Corridor, connecting China to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye. As for the energy sector, Kazakhstan has also taken steps to diversify its export route through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, thereby reducing its reliance on the CPC route that transits Russian territory. These adjustments demonstrate Kazakhstan’s adaptability to fit its long-standing goals of reducing structural dependence on any single partner, clearly reflecting the core principles of its multi-vector foreign policy.

           Taken together, these developments show that Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy has been employed in a strategic and effective way to respond to the geopolitical and economic challenges caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Rather than only reacting to external pressure, Kazakhstan has also used these challenges as opportunities to promote its own national interests, showing a high level of pragmatism and flexibility. This approach reflects key ideas from realism and hedging theory, where states try to protect their independence by avoiding close alignment or bandwagoning with any single major power. Instead of choosing one side, Kazakhstan has carefully balanced its relations with different major powers and used these relationships to its advantage. In doing so, it has reduced risks while also creating new economic and strategic opportunities. Kazakhstan’s experience also offers an important lesson for countries located between major powers or within their proximity, showing that careful decision-making, flexibility, and engagement with multiple partners can help protect sovereignty and increase national benefits in an uncertain global environment.

4. Implications for Thailand

           Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy offers valuable lessons for Thailand in navigating an increasingly complex and competitive international environment, particularly in maintaining strategic balance among major powers and practicing proactive, flexible diplomacy. First, like Kazakhstan, Thailand operates in a geopolitical context where relations with multiple major powers, most notably the United States and China, must be carefully managed. In practice, Thailand has pursued a balanced approach by sustaining its long-standing security alliance with the United States, while simultaneously deepening economic and infrastructure cooperation with China, including participation in major connectivity projects. At the same time, Thailand has diversified its external relations by strengthening partnerships with other players, thereby avoiding overdependence on any single actor, and maximizing strategic and economic opportunities. This multidirectional engagement reflects a pragmatic, interest-based approach similar to Kazakhstan’s multi-vector strategy, which prioritizes flexibility over rigid or ideological alignment. For Thailand, this underscores the importance of maintaining diplomatic adaptability, actively engaging in multilateral platforms, and positioning itself as a constructive and reliable partner in regional and global affairs. By sustaining such a calibrated and proactive diplomatic posture, Thailand can enhance its strategic autonomy, strengthen its international standing, and more effectively navigate an increasingly multipolar and uncertain global environment.

           Second, Kazakhstan’s experience highlights the importance of enhancing economic resilience through diversification. By actively reducing dependence on any single sector, particularly traditional reliance on resource-based sectors, or on a limited number of external partners, Kazakhstan has strengthened its economic adaptability in the face of external shocks. Thailand can draw important lessons from this approach, especially as the global economy becomes increasingly fragmented amid intensifying competition among major powers and a gradual shift toward a more multipolar world. In this evolving environment, Thailand has pursued proactive economic diplomacy to boost the economy, restore international confidence, and enhance global competitiveness. Thailand has prioritized regional integration through ASEAN and engagement with international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), while also exploring closer economic engagement with emerging groupings such as BRICS, as part of its broader diversification strategy in an increasingly multipolar global economy. Building on this foundation, Thailand can further enhance its economic resilience by broadening trade and investment ties with emerging regions, including Central Asia. In doing so, Thailand would not only mitigate risks arising from geopolitical uncertainties but also capitalize on opportunities in an increasingly interconnected yet competitive global economic landscape.

           Finally, Kazakhstan’s use of multilateralism and regionalism as key mechanisms of its multi-vector foreign policy highlights the importance of leveraging international and regional frameworks to enhance national influence. Thailand, through its active role in ASEAN and other regional mechanisms such as ACD, of which it is a founding member, is well positioned to adopt a similar approach to engage with emerging regions and middle powers. In recent years, Thailand has demonstrated an increasing capacity for proactive multilateral engagement, for instance by hosting international discussions and cooperative initiatives to address transnational challenges. A notable example is its successful hosting of the International Conference on the Global Partnership against Online Scams in December 2025, which reflects Thailand’s growing role in addressing issues of global concern. Thailand can also further utilize broader interregional platforms of which it is a member, such as CICA, to deepen its engagement with Central Asian countries through participation in dialogue mechanisms, confidence-building measures, and cooperation in areas where Thailand has demonstrated active involvement, including sustainable development and the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, Thailand can expand its outreach through Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy, including academic exchanges, business forums, and sectoral cooperation in areas where Thailand champions such as tourism, healthcare, science and innovation, and education, thereby fostering long-term partnerships with the region. By more systematically leveraging such multilateral and regional frameworks, Thailand can extend its diplomatic reach beyond its traditional sphere, diversify its external partnerships, and position itself as a constructive and reliable middle power capable of engaging across regions in an increasingly multipolar and interconnected global order.

5. Conclusion

           From the perspectives of realism and hedging theory, Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy can be understood as a pragmatic and adaptive strategy for navigating an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape characterized by intensifying major power competition and global uncertainty. Rooted in the core principles of balance, flexibility, and diversification, Kazakhstan has maintained its strategic autonomy while engaging constructively with multiple centers of power, including Russia, China, and the West. The evolution of this strategy from a security-oriented policy under President Nazarbayev to a more economically driven and connectivity-focused strategy under President Tokayev demonstrates its capacity to respond to shifting domestic and international dynamics. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s active use of multilateralism and regionalism, alongside its role as a convener of international dialogue, has enhanced its global standing and reinforced its position as a constructive middle power. For Thailand, this experience offers valuable lessons in maintaining strategic balance among major powers, strengthening economic resilience through diversification, and pursuing proactive and flexible diplomacy in an increasingly multipolar world. By expanding engagement with emerging regions such as Central Asia and leveraging multilateral platforms for deeper cooperation, Thailand can broaden its diplomatic and economic horizons while safeguarding its national interests. Ultimately, Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy offers a relevant model for small and middle powers seeking to navigate uncertainty, preserve strategic autonomy, and maximize opportunities in an increasingly complex and evolving international environment.

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* Dr. Orathai Phubunlap Gunaseelan serves as Minister-Counsellor at the Royal Thai Embassy in Astana, Kazakhstan. She has extensive experience in international relations, with a particular focus on Russia, Central Asia, and the wider Eurasian region. Her research and professional interests also include women’s empowerment, gender equality, and human resource development. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely her own and do not reflect those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand or the Royal Thai Embassy in Astana.